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Prior theoretical and empirical research has shown that disagreement can cause speculative trading 
which leads to a speculative premium in stock prices.  We examine whether managers take actions 
to reduce or prolong the disagreement among investors. We establish causality using the 
exogenous variation in speculative trading after the yearly reconstitution of the Russell 1000/2000 
indices. We find that speculative trading reduces the frequency, likelihood, and precision of 
management forecasts.  This relationship is significantly stronger when short-sale constraints are 
more binding.  Consistent with theory, the effect is more pronounced when managers have stronger 
equity-based incentives.  We also find that managers sell equity to benefit from the speculative 
premium.  In summary, our results suggest that managers issue forecasts opportunistically in 
response to speculative trading – they keep silent whenever possible, and issue fewer and less 
precise forecasts to prolong disagreement and overpricing. 
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DISAGREEMENT, SPECULATION AND MANAGEMENT FORECASTS 
 
I.  Introduction 
A large financial economics literature beginning with Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps 
(1978), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) has suggested that heterogeneous beliefs1 among 
investors can lead to speculative trading (or speculation) and to share prices that exceed 
fundamental value.2 This speculative premium, or overvaluation, may not be arbitraged away due 
to market frictions such as short-sale constraints, noise-trader risk or capital constraints (see Xiong 
(2013) for an excellent survey).  Empirical studies find strong support for the prediction that 
heterogeneous beliefs lead to overvaluation (see, for e.g., Deither, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; 
Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002; Geszy, Musto and Reed, 2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Ofek and 
Richardson, 2003; Hong and Stein, 2003; Nagel, 2005; Bris, Goetzman and Zhu, 2007; Chang, 
Cheng and Yu, 2007; Xiong and Yu, 2011; and Pan et al., 2015). 
Prior literature suggests that managers benefit from overvalued equity because of the 
increase in their firm-related wealth (Jensen, 2005).   This can incentivize managers to take actions 
to boost the current stock price at the expense of long-term value (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 
2005; Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, 2006). Issuing management forecasts is a flexible and 
effective strategy for managers to influence the disagreement among investors.  Both Harrison and 
Kreps (1978) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) highlight that fundamentals are the primary 
 
1 We use heterogeneous beliefs, differences of opinion, and disagreement interchangeably. 
2 Other theoretical papers include De Long, et al. (1990), Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Morris 
(1996), Kyle and Wang (1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Odean (1998), Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002), 
Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2005), Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006). See Section II for more comprehensive 




source of disagreement among investors.  Management forecasts are informative about 
fundamentals and can alter investors’ beliefs.  Importantly, managers have discretion over the 
frequency and content of management forecasts.3  
This paper examines whether managers issue forecasts opportunistically in response to 
speculative trading.  Specifically, we test whether there is a causal relationship from speculation 
to disclosure.  Speculation is an endogenous variable.   Management disclosures may induce 
speculation by exacerbating the disagreement between investors who interpret the same public 
signal differently (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and Pearson, 1995).  In this case, causality 
is in the opposite direction, from disclosure to speculation.  Similarly, the association between 
speculation and management forecasts may be driven by some common but unobservable factors. 
For example, if macroeconomic uncertainty increases, it may increase speculation regarding the 
firms’ prospects while also motivating managers to make more disclosures to reduce that 
uncertainty.4   
We address this endogeneity concern by using the assignment of firms to the Russell 
1000/2000 index as an instrument for speculative trading.  Firms around the Russell 1000/2000 
cutoff are unable to manipulate their assignment, and these firms’ inclusion in either Russell 1000 
or Russell 2000 can be treated as a random event.  Because the Russell indices are value-weighted, 
the largest firms in Russell 2000 have significantly greater weights than the smallest firms in 
Russell 1000.5  In turn, institutional investors who track or benchmark their performance to these 
 
3 There is a rich literature in accounting showing that management forecasts are informative.  See, for e.g., Penman, 
(1983, 1985); Lev and Penman (1990); Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008); Beyer et al., (2010); Seybert and Yang 
(2012). 
4 As yet another example, a new product launch may lead investors to speculate on its success while at the same 
time requiring additional disclosures by managers regarding future incremental sales and earnings. 
5 For example, the 800th through 1,000th largest stocks have relatively small weights within Russell 1000 since they 
are the smallest firms in the index, while the firms ranked from 1,001st to 1,200th have relatively large weights in 
Russell 2000 since they are the largest firms in the index.  
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indices hold greater positions in the largest stocks in Russell 2000 than in the smallest stocks in 
Russell 1000 (Boone and White, 2015; Appel et al., 2016; Bird and Karolyi, 2016, 2017; Crane et 
al., 2016; Khan et al., 2017; Chen et al, 2018).  Greater passive institutional ownership in the 
largest stocks in Russell 2000 reduces trading costs to speculators.  It may also create more 
speculative trading opportunities when passive investors trade in response to fund flows or to 
rebalance their portfolios.  Both effects are likely to increase speculative trading in the largest 
stocks in Russell 2000 relative to the smallest stocks in Russell 1000.  Consistent with these 
arguments, we find that our proxy for speculation is significantly greater for firms in the top of 
Russell 2000 than firms in the bottom of Russell 1000.6  
The empirical literature relies on trading volume and volume-based measures such as share 
turnover to measure speculative trading (e.g., Harris and Raviv,1993; Bamber et al., 1999; 
Berkman et al., 2009).  However, trading volume also reflects liquidity trades or rebalancing needs 
(e.g., Hong and Stein, 2007).  We use nine proxies of differences of opinion to identify the part of 
share turnover driven by disagreement using the three-pass regression filter (3PRF) of Kelly and 
Pruitt (2015).  This is the measure of speculative trading used in the paper.  We use institutional 
ownership as a proxy for short-sale constraints (Nagel, 2005; Asquith, Pathak and Ritter, 2005; 
Berkman et al., 2009).  Using data from 1996 to 2006 for Russell 3000 firms, we find that 
speculative trading reduces the frequency, likelihood, and precision of management forecasts.   In 
addition, we find that the relationship between speculative trading and the frequency, probability, 
and precision of management forecasts is significantly stronger (i.e., more negative) when short-
sale constraints are more binding.  Our results suggest that managers issue forecasts 
 
 




opportunistically in response to speculative trading – they keep silent whenever possible, and issue 
fewer and less precise forecasts to prolong disagreement and overpricing. 
To support the primary results, we test one important channel through which speculation 
may affect management forecasts. Bolton et al. (2005) argue that in speculative markets, 
shareholders incentivize managers to boost the current stock price by tilting their compensation 
towards stock and stock option grants.  When managers have stronger equity-based incentives, 
their wealth is more sensitive to the stock price which includes the speculative premium. As a 
result, managers with greater equity incentives have greater incentives to issue management 
forecasts opportunistically in response to speculation.  Consistent with this prediction, we find that 
the effect of speculation on management forecast activity is more pronounced when managers have 
stronger equity-based incentives. We also find that managers are more likely to sell their shares in 
response to greater speculation, consistent with our prediction that managers trade to take 
advantage of the resulting price.  
In additional tests, we find that managers are more likely to cater to optimistic investors 
when there is greater speculation and more binding short-sale constraints.  We analyze Regulation 
SHO that relaxes short-sale constraints for a randomly chosen sample of Russell 3000 firms. We 
find that our main results hold using Regulation SHO to determine whether short-sale constraints 
are relatively binding or not.  A key assumption in our study is that management forecasts reduce 
speculative trading by decreasing disagreement. Consistent with this assumption, we find that the 
three-day cumulative excess returns around management forecast dates become smaller when there 
is greater speculation and more binding short-sale constraints. We also show that the main results 
are robust to controlling for contemporaneous analyst coverage and to using ranks based on market 
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values at the end of May rather than index weights to determine the firms around the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold.  
We make the following contributions to the extant literature. First, we show that speculation 
driven by heterogeneous beliefs has a causal effect on management’s voluntary disclosure policy. 
Our results are consistent with managers taking actions to maintain or prolong the speculative 
premium in prices (Jensen, 2005; Bolton et al., 2006).  Second, we extend the literature on the 
effects of stock prices on managers behavior.  Prior literature has shown that overvaluation leads 
to higher investments, greater reliance on external financing, and earnings management (e.g., 
Gilchrist et al., 2005; Chi and Gupta, 2009; Polk and Sapienza, 2009; Warasawitharana and 
Whited, 2016). We show that managers also alter their disclosure policy to prolong the 
overvaluation.  Third, we construct a new, less noisy measure of speculation using the three-pass 
regression filter of Kelly and Pruitt (2015).  Researchers can use this measure to test other 
hypotheses related to speculation.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. Section III 
describes our measure of speculative trading, identification strategy, and data and sample selection. 
Section IV describes our main empirical results.  Section V discusses the results of several 
additional tests.  Section VI presents our conclusions. 
II.  Literature Review 
Kaldor (1939) defines speculation as “the purchase (or sale) of goods with a view 
to resale (repurchase) at a later date, where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a 
change in the relevant prices relatively to the ruling price”.  Prior research suggests that 
speculation driven by disagreement influences stock prices.  With binding short-sale constraints, 
investors may overpay for a stock relative to their own valuation of future dividends because of 
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the embedded option to sell the shares at an even higher price in the future (e.g., Harrison and 
Kreps, 1978; Morris, 1996; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). Stock ownership provides an option to 
reap speculative profit from other investors with more optimistic beliefs. Hence, in a stock market 
where investors disagree about a firm’s valuation and short-sale constraints are binding, 
speculative bubbles may arise. Importantly, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that the resulting 
speculative bubble is associated with greater speculative trading. The theory is supported by 
empirical studies that show that disagreement and speculative trading are negatively correlated 
with future excess returns (e.g., Deither, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Chen, Hong and Stein, 
2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Hong and Stein, 2003; Bris, Goetzman and Zhu, 2007; Boehme 
et al, 2006; Chang, Cheng and Yu, 2007; Chen, Lung and Wang,2009; Mei, Scheinkman and 
Xiong, 2009; Xiong and Yu, 2011; Pan et al., 2015).  The theory is also supported by Palfrey and 
Wang (2012) and Fellner and Theissen (2014), who show that speculation and short-sale 
constraints lead to overpricing in a laboratory setting.  
        Speculation may also lead to greater trading risk (e.g., Varian, 1989; David, 2008; Carlin et 
al., 2014). David (2008) suggests that investors with heterogeneous beliefs speculate on the 
relative accuracy of their models’ forecasts and face the risk that stock prices move in line with 
the trading models of other speculators. Carlin et al. (2014) argue that speculators face both 
fundamental risk and risk that their beliefs about others are incorrect. This additional risk may lead 
risk-averse investors to require a higher rate of return (risk premium) for holding more speculative 
stocks and thereby may result in lower stock prices.  This theory has some empirical support 
(Anderson et al., 2005; Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006; Doukas et al. 2006; Carlin et al. 2014).  The 
risk premium effect is more likely to be evident when short-sale constraints are not binding and 
there is no speculative premium. 
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 Given that managers have incentives to maximize their companies’ stock price, they may 
take actions in response to speculation.  We posit that one way for managers to influence the stock 
price is by making selective voluntary disclosures such as management forecasts (e.g., Bergman 
and Roychowdhury, 2008; Seybert and Yang, 2012; Li and Zhang, 2015). Management forecasts 
are informative to investors. Beyer et al. (2010) show that management forecasts explain 15.67% 
of quarterly stock return variance during the sample period from 1994 to 2007, accounting for 55% 
of the total return variances explained by the five types of disclosure they study.7  Importantly, 
management forecasts can reduce uncertainty and heterogeneity in beliefs about future earnings 
(e.g., Baginski et al., 1993; Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008).  Moreover, forecasts provide 
managers the flexibility to choose the characteristics of the information release, such as the 
frequency, form, horizon and timing (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010).  
One plausible management strategy to prolong speculative premium is to reduce the amount 
of information provided to investors. Previous research suggests that there are equilibria where 
managers disclose favorable information but withhold unfavorable information to maximize stock 
price. 8 Favorable news can become unfavorable when the stock price is inflated. Hence, managers 
may voluntarily disclose less information when stock prices are inflated. For example, Bergman 
and Roychowdhury (2008) show that managers issue fewer long-horizon management forecasts in 
high sentiment period and issue more management forecasts in low sentiment period. Moreover, 
disclosing more information may directly reduce uncertainty and disagreement among investors 
and further decrease speculative premium (Dorobantu, 2006). Consequently, we expect managers 
to issue fewer forecasts in response to greater speculative trading. 
 
7 These include management forecasts, earnings announcements, earnings pre-announcements, analyst forecasts, and 
SEC filings. 
8 The conditions for partial disclosure are (1) there are proprietary costs for voluntary disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983, 
2001); and (2) investors are uncertain whether a manager is informed (Dye, 1985).   
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The strategy of nondisclosure is not always feasible when managers are subject to litigation 
and reputation costs (e.g., Skinner, 1994).  An alternative strategy is for managers to reduce the 
precision of their management forecasts.  Prior literature shows that a management forecast that is 
more precise is associated with stronger market reaction and greater informativeness (e.g., 
Baginski et al., 1993). Managers often choose the precision of their earnings forecasts to influence 
investors’ perceptions and in turn stock prices. Cheng et al. (2013) find that prior to insider sales 
(purchases), managers increase (decrease) the precision of their earnings forecasts when the news 
is positive and decrease (increase) precision of earnings forecasts when the news is negative. Li 
and Zhang (2015) find that managers reduce the precision of bad news forecasts in response to 
increased short selling pressure. Hertzberg (2017) analytically show that managers can commit to 
making less precise disclosures to exacerbate disagreement and prolong the speculative premium. 
Consequently, we expect managers to issue forecasts that are less precise in response to greater 
speculative trading. 
III. Data and Research Design 
A. Measuring speculative trading 
This section discusses how we construct our measure for speculative trading. Prior research 
most commonly measures speculation as either turnover or trading volume. However, turnover 
and trading volume also capture other information that is not directly related to investor 
speculation, such as liquidity demand and portfolio rebalancing. The resulting noise may distort 
the empirical tests. To alleviate this issue, we isolate disagreement-based turnover from total 
turnover. We adopt the three-pass regression filter (3PRF) of Kelly and Pruitt (2015) to aggregate 
the information about heterogeneous beliefs embedded in several variables.  Although Kelly and 
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Pruitt (2015) originally develop this model for time series forecasting, Rytchkov et al. (2017) 
extend it to forecast variables in the cross-section of firms.   
The first step of 3PRF is to construct a linear factor model in which turnover is driven by the 
latent factor, namely heterogeneous beliefs. The factor model we choose is motived by the “No-
trade theorem” (e.g., Tirole, 1982; Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Morris, 1995). For trading to occur, 
investors must have either heterogeneous beliefs or liquidity, diversification, or portfolio 
rebalancing needs (e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Biais and Bossaerts,1998; Xiong, 2013).        
We express the factor model as: 
 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖,      (1) 
where TURN is share turnover and  𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖 is heterogeneous beliefs for firm i in month t.
9  The key 
assumptions for this model are that heterogeneous beliefs are uncorrelated with non-speculative 
demand for trading and that current heterogeneous beliefs capture past heterogeneous beliefs. 
Heterogeneous beliefs in prior periods can be thought of as heterogeneous priors, which are 
included in the current period heterogeneous beliefs. Namely, 
                     𝐸(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡,𝑖|𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡,𝑖|𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖, 𝐻𝐵𝑡−1,𝑖, … , 𝐻𝐵𝑡−𝑛,𝑖)                                    
(2) 
We then select proxies for heterogeneous beliefs that satisfy the following factor structure:  
       𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑡,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡,𝑖.                                                             (3) 
         The nine proxies commonly used in the empirical literature include the volatility of excess 
returns (Vol), bid-ask spread (Spread), unexpected volume (ASUV), dispersion of analyst earnings 
forecasts scaled by stock price or the mean analyst forecast (ADISP1, ADISP2), volume-weighted 
 
9 We define heterogeneous beliefs to encompass heterogeneous priors, heterogeneous interpretation, or heterogeneous 
information precision.   
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option strike dispersions and open-interest-weighted option strike dispersions (ODISP1, ODISP2), 
open interest (OI), and option trading volume (OV).10 These variables are constructed using stock 
price data, analyst data, and options data. Stock price data and options data primarily capture 
disagreement about valuations (prices) and analyst data primarily captures disagreement about 
fundamentals. Appendix A shows the construction of each variable. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and the 99% level and then standardized to have a mean of zero and variance of one. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of TURN and the nine proxies before they are standardized. 
The sample contains Russell 3000 firms, from January 1996 to September 2006 due to the 
availability of Russell reconstitution data.   
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The next step is to run cross-sectional regressions of TURN on each of the nine proxies 
individually for each calendar month from Jan 1996 to Jan 2007. For each month, we estimate nine 
slopes, one for each proxy, which we denote as µj, j=1, 2,…9. Then for each firm and each month, 
we regress proxyj on µj conditional on having at least five observations. The slope from each 
regression is the estimated value of heterogeneous beliefs, noted as 𝐻?̂?𝑖,𝑡.
11 According to 
Proposition 1 (page 1348) in Light, Maslov, and Rytchkov (2017), 𝐻?̂?𝑖,𝑡 converges to the true 






                                                             (4) 
where  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐻𝐵𝑖,𝑡) is a constant but 𝛽 may be time-varying. 
 
10 See Bessembinder et al., 1996; Dieither et al., 2004; Boehme et al., 2006; Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006; Garfinkel and 
Sokobin, 2006; Berkman et al., 2009; Garfinkel, 2009; Friesen et al., 2012; Zhu., 2015. 
11 For additional assumptions of 3PRF, please refer to Assumption 2 through 6 in Kelly and Pruitt (2015), p296, and 
Assumption 1 through 4 in Light, Maslov, and Rytchkov (2017), p1345-1346. 
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In the final step, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 on 𝐻?̂?𝑖,𝑡 for each month to 
obtain the fitted value for each firm. Theorem 1 in Kelly and Pruitt (2015) indicates: 
 𝑇𝑈𝑅?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑝
→ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑡𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡,𝑖|𝐻𝐵𝑡,𝑖)                                         (5)  
That is, the fitted turnover converges to the expected turnover due to heterogeneous beliefs. The 
fitted turnover ( 𝑇𝑈𝑅?̂?𝑖,𝑡) is our proxy for speculation (SPT), and it is estimated at the monthly 
level for each Russell 3000 firm. We average the adjusted R2s in all years from 1996 to 2006 and 
find that the fitted turnover explains about 40% of the total turnover.  
Eq. (6) shows the relationship between the proxy for disagreement-based speculation (SPT) 
and the nine proxies for heterogeneous beliefs. Specifically, we regress SPT on the nine proxies to 
obtain the following coefficients: 
SPT̂ = 0.106 + 0.269VOL + 0.552SPREAD + 0.193ASUV + 0.110ODISP1 + 
+0.169ODISP2 − 0.099ADISP1 − 0.124ADISP2 + 0.074OV − 0.018OI                 (6)                                                                   
According to Eq. (6), the bid-ask spread (SPREAD), volatility of excess returns (VOL) and 
unexpected trading volume (ASUV) are the three most important components in SPT. Open interest 
(OI) and option trading volume (OV) contribute little to SPT.  The coefficients on the two 
dispersions of analysts’ forecasts are negative. This might be due to analysts’ herding behavior. 
When faced with great information uncertainty, analysts often imitate the consensus forecast in 
their forecasts (e.g., Huang et al., 2017), reducing the dispersion of analyst forecasts. 
B. Russell index reconstitution and instrumental variables 
We address the endogeneity of speculative trading by using the reconstitutions of Russell 
1000 and Russell 2000 indices.  Russell 1000 and 2000 indices are annually reconstituted using a 
mechanical method that is publicly known in advance. FTSE Russell ranks all listed US firms 
according to their market values, determined by the closing price on the last trading day of May 
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and the total common shares outstanding as adjusted by FTSE Russell. The first 1000 firms 
constitute the Russell 1000 index while the next 2000 firms constitute the Russell 2000 index. If a 
firm has multiple classes of stock, then FTSE Russell uses the class with the largest float (Crane 
et al., 2015). Although FTSE Russell determines index composition using public market values at 
the end of May, index weights are determined at the end of June using FTSE imputed market 
values. Because a firm’s index assignment depends on its market value rank, whether a firm around 
the market value threshold of Russell 1000 is assigned to Russell 1000 or Russell 2000 is not 
known ex-ante. As a result, firms around the threshold are unable to ensure their inclusion in 
Russell 1000 or predict precisely which index they get assigned to. In other words, the Russell 
1000/Russell 2000 assignment around the threshold is locally random (e.g., Boone and White, 
2015; Crane et al., 2015; Appel et al., 2016; Bird and Karolyi, 2016, 2017; Khan et al., 2017; Chen 
et al. 2018).  
      Whether a firm is assigned to Russell 1000 or Russell 2000 has implications for its ownership 
structure, and in turn for speculative trading.  Because the Russell indices are value-weighted, the 
largest firms in the Russell 2000 have significantly greater index weights than the smallest firms 
in the Russell 1000.  Institutional investors who track or benchmark their performance to these 
indices must buy proportionately more shares in firms at the top of Russell 2000 than in firms at 
the bottom of Russell 1000 after FTSE Russell announces the reconstituted indices. The firms at 
the top of Russell 2000 attract more institutional investors (e.g., Boone and White, 2015; Crane et 
al., 2016; Khan et al., 2017). This, in turn, can affect speculation.  Institutions tracking the Russell 
indices trade in response to investor fund flows or rebalancing needs, leading to lower trading costs 
and more trading opportunities in these stocks. The increased trading opportunities attract 
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speculators to enter the market.12 Hence, index inclusion around the threshold is likely to be a 
suitable instrument for speculation.  We test the relevance of this instrumental variables approach 
in Section IV. 
         FTSE Russell uses confidential data to adjust shares outstanding and compute market values 
at the end of May, but does not provide details on its methodology.  This makes it impossible to 
identify firms around the threshold precisely. Previous studies propose two methods to deal with 
this issue. The first method is to approximate each firm’s market value at the end of May with data 
from CRSP and Compustat and then to rank the firms accordingly (e.g., Chang et al., 2015; Crane 
et al.,2015; Bird and Karolyi, 2017). The second method is to use index assignments and weights 
from data provided by FTSE Russell (e.g., Boone and White, 2015; Appel et al., 2016; Khan et al. 
2017; Chen et al., 2018). The data from FTSE Russell contains a binary variable that labels the 
actual index assignment for each firm and the ranks of firms based on index weights at the end of 
June.  
We use the second method to rank our firms around the threshold. The advantage of using 
Russell’s actual index assignment data is it avoids the measurement error problem for binary 
variables. The ranking based on the market capitalization calculated with data from CRSP or 
Compustat can be quite different from the exact rank set by FTSE Russell. It is possible that some 
firms that should have been classified into Russell 2000 are misclassified into Russell 1000, and 
vice versa. This measurement error could lead to inconsistent estimation.13  
 
12 To illustrate, suppose at T=1 speculator A wants to purchase a stock at $5 per share but investor B, who currently 
holds the stock, is only willing to sell it at $6 per share. As a result, A will not be in the market. Suppose at T=2, 
another speculator, C, wants to purchase the same stock at $5.5 per share.  There will still be no trade because B’s 
asking price has not been met. However, if at T=1 investor B is an institution faced with redemptions and has to sell 
the shares, speculator A can purchase it at $5 per share at T=1 and resell it at $5.5 per share to speculator C at T=2. 
13 We show in Section V that our results are similar if we use the identification strategy of Crane et al. (2015) to 
construct the bandwidths around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. 
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One potential concern of using index assignment as an instrument for the proxy for 
speculation is that index assignment is also correlated with institutional ownership (e.g., Boone 
and White, 2015; Crane et al., 2015; Bird and Karolyi, 2016).  Institutional ownership may affect 
management’s voluntary disclosures directly (e.g., Boone and White, 2015).  We alleviate this 
concern by including institutional ownership as a control variable in our model.  This method is 
referred to as a conditional instrumental variable estimation (see, for e.g., Morgan and Winship, 
2007). Another reason for including institutional ownership in the model is that institutional 
ownership is a commonly used proxy for short-sale constraints (e.g., Nagel, 2003; Asquith et al., 
2005; Berkman et al., 2009).  Institutions are the main suppliers of shares to short sellers; when 
institutional ownership is low, it is more difficult and costly for short sellers to borrow the shares 
(e.g., Prado et al., 2016). Because institutional ownership is likely endogenous to disclosure policy 
(e.g., Boone and White, 2015), we also instrument institutional ownership for each firm using the 
average institutional ownership of other firms across different periods in the sample.  Appendix B 
provides details on this approach. 
C. Sample and data 
The sample consists of Russell 3000 index constituents from 1996 to 2006. 14  FTSE Russell 
did not provide us Russell membership data prior to 1996.  The sample ends in 2006 because after 
2006 FTSE Russell no longer determines index assignments based only on market values at the 
end of May.  Hence, the local randomization around the threshold may no longer hold after 2006. 
We merge the Russell data with institutional holding data from Spectrum 13F, stock data from 
CRSP, and firm-level accounting data from Compustat. We obtain management forecasts data and 
 




analyst forecasts data from I/B/E/S and equity-based compensation data from ExecuComp. The 
final sample includes 6,480 firms and 32,977 firm-year observations.  
The primary independent variables are SPT, derived using 3PRF as described in Section 
III.A, and institutional ownership (INST).  Similar to SPT, we standardize INST to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one.  This mitigates any mechanical correlation between SPT and 
SPT×INST.  SPT is measured in September (two months after reconstitution). We choose 
September because this is the first month after reconstitution with available institutional ownership 
data.15  Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the subsequent tests, 
separately for Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 firms. The mean and median of SPT are higher for 
Russell 1000 firms than for Russell 2000 firms.  The mean frequency of management forecasts is 
also higher for Russell 1000 firms than for Russell 2000 firms. The mean precision of earnings 
forecasts is similar for both Russell 1000 firms and Russell 2000 firms. The mean institutional 
ownership is 0.64 for Russell 1000 firms and 0.53 for Russell 2000 firms, similar to the result of 
Crane et al. (2016). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
D. Estimation model 
We test how speculation affects management forecasts within a small bandwidth (200, 250, 
300 firms) around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We adopt a two-stage model to estimate the 
relationship between the dependent variable (i.e., properties of management forecasts) and the 
variables of interest (speculative trading, institutional ownership, and their interaction). Since 
properties of management forecasts include count data (frequency of management forecasts) and 
 
15 Institutional ownership data are made public at the end of each calendar quarter.  Our results are similar if we use 
the average SPT of July, August, and September. 
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binomial data (likelihood of a management forecast), we use a Logit regression and a Poisson 
regression, respectively. We use the control function approach to estimate our models (e.g., 
Woodridge, 2002, 2015; Marra and Radice, 2011).16  The two-stage model is specified as follows: 
𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝛼2𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖,1 (7)                                      
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖,2   (8)                                                                                                                                                                              
𝑆𝑃𝑇 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑅2000 × 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
                             +𝛾6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖,3                                                                                            (9)                                                                                                                                              
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 × 𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃6𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
                                  𝜃7𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜃8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃9𝜖1̂,𝑖 + 𝜃10𝜖2̂,𝑖 + 𝜃11𝜖3̂,𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡              (10)                                                         
        In the first stage, we estimate Eq. (7), (8) and (9) via OLS and obtain the residual from each 
equation.  Equation (7) is equivalent to a sharp regression discontinuity regression (RDD) with a 
binary treatment variable, R2000, which equals 1 for firms assigned to Russell 2000 and 0 for 
firms assigned to Russell 1000. We use Eq. (7) to isolate the endogenous component of SPT. 
Equation (8) isolates the endogenous component of institutional ownership. IVinsti is our 
instrument for INSTi,t as explained in Appendix B. Equation (9) isolates the endogenous part of 
the interaction of SPT with INST. Following Crane et al. (2015), we control for the difference 
between the rank based on the market values at the end of May and the rank based on the weights 
assigned by FTSE Russell (Float). This captures the change in index weights due to float 
adjustment of FTSE Russell at the end of June. We control for the logarithm of market value at 
the end of May calculated using CRSP data (LnMV).17   
 
16 2SLS is not valid for nonlinear models.  For a linear model, 2SLS and the control function approach generate the 
same estimation results. However, the control function approach can also be used to estimate nonlinear and 
nonparametric models (e.g., Marra and Radice, 2011). 
17 Our results are similar if we include additional control variables, including ROA, Market to Book ratio (MB), 
Leverage (Lev), volatility of cash flow (Stdocf), capital expenditure (Invest), cash flow from financing (Finance), 
revenue growth (Growth), Big4 auditors (Big4), probability of informed trading (PIN), liquidity (Liqudity) and 
litigation (litigation).  Variable definitions are reported in Appendix A. 
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In the second-stage regression given by Eq. (10), we estimate the effect of speculation on 
several dependent variables after controlling for the residuals from the first stage (ϵ̂1,i, ϵ̂2,i , ϵ̂3,i). 
The second stage also includes the firm’s stock return in September. This controls for any 
contemporaneous news and private information contained in price that in turn affects 
management’s voluntary disclosure policy. 
IV. Tests and Results 
A. Instrumental variables 
In this section, we examine the relevance assumption of the instruments for speculation and 
institutional ownership. The bandwidth selection around the Russell 1000/2000 reconstitution 
threshold involves a trade-off between variance and bias. As the bandwidth decreases, the 
estimates become more accurate but the variances grow.   We use three relatively large bandwidths 
(±200, ±250, ±300 firms from the threshold) to ensure sufficient sample size.  Panel A of Table 3 
reports estimates of the discontinuity in SPT around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold as given by 
Eq. (7).  We find that index assignment around the cutoff satisfies the relevance assumption of an 
IV.  The results are similar for all three bandwidths. For example, using the 300 bandwidth, the 
coefficient on R2000 is 0.186 (t=4.48).  This suggests that SPT for firms at the top of Russell 2000 
is significantly greater than SPT for firms at the bottom of Russell 1000.  Panel B of Table 3 shows 
the relationship between INST and its instrument, as given by Eq. (8).  We find that IVinst is 
significant for each bandwidth. For example, using the 300 bandwidth, the coefficient on IVinst is 
0.65 (t=14.28).18 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
18 We also find a significant relationship between SPT*INST and R2000*IVinst for each bandwidth, as given by Eq. 
(9).  The results are not tabulated for brevity and are available from the authors upon request. 
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B. Properties of management forecasts 
We examine three separate characteristics of management forecast – the frequency and 
likelihood of management forecasts, and their precision.  We define FREQ as the number of 
management forecasts (number of earnings forecasts plus the the number of sales forecasts for any 
future quarter or year) during September and October of each respective year.19  We only consider 
management forecasts issued before the corresponding forecast period end date.  Forecasts issued 
after the forecast period end date are preannouncements because managers know the actual 
numbers.  We define PROB as one if managers issue at least one forecast (quarterly and annually, 
earnings or sales) during the period, and zero otherwise. Given that the frequency of management 
forecast is count data, we estimate a Poisson model for FREQ in the second stage regression as 
given by Eq. (10).20  We estimate a Logit model for PROB. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results for the frequency of management forecasts. We find 
that SPT is negative and highly statistically significant for all three bandwidths.  For example, 
using the 300 bandwidth, the coefficient on SPT is -3.558 with t-stat of -1.94. When institutional 
ownership is at its mean (0), managers reduce the frequency of management forecasts in response 
to speculation.  One standard deviation increase in SPT is associated with 2.348% fewer 
management forecasts, on average.  We also find that SPT×INST is positive and significant for 
each bandwidth.  Using the 300 bandwidth, the coefficient on SPT×INST is 1.125 with t-stat of 
2.12.  This finding shows that as short sales become more binding (i.e., when institutional 
ownership decreases), managers issue even fewer forecasts in response to greater speculative 
trading.  For example, when institutional ownership is at the fifth percentile, one standard deviation 
 
19 Our results are robust to using alternative windows after reconstitution (4 months, 6 months and 8 months).   
20 We also estimate a negative binomial model for FREQ and find similar results. 
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increase in SPT is associated with 3.645% fewer management forecasts, on average.  These 
findings are consistent with our prediction that managers issue fewer forecasts in response to 
speculation, especially when short-sale constraints are more binding.  
          We find similar results using the probability as the dependent variable in Eq. (10).  The 
results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.  The coefficient on SPT is negative and highly 
statistically significant for all three bandwidths.  For example, using the 300 bandwidth, the 
coefficient on SPT is –5.975 with t-stat of -2.23.  When institutional ownership is at its mean (0), 
managers are less likely to issue forecasts when speculation is greater.  One standard deviation 
increase in SPT is associated with 57.33% lower likelihood of managers issuing a forecast, on 
average.   We also find that SPT×INST is positive and significant for each bandwidth.  Using the 
300 bandwidth, the coefficient on SPT×INST is 2.058 with t-stat of 3.31.  This finding shows that 
as short-sale constraints become more binding (i.e., when institutional ownership decreases), 
managers are even less likely to issue a forecast in response to greater speculative trading.  For 
example, when institutional ownership is at the fifth percentile, one standard deviation increase in 
SPT is associated with 60.82% lower likelihood of managers issuing a forecast, on average.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
       In Table 5 we examine the relationship between speculation and the precision of management 
earnings forecasts (Precision).  We use the specificity of management forecasts to proxy for 
information precision: 3 for a point forecast; 2 for a range forecast; 1 for an open-ended interval 
forecast; 0 for a qualitative forecast; and -1 for no forecast. We use all quarterly and annual 
earnings forecasts in September and October of each respective year.21  Panel A of Table 5 shows 
 




the results using a linear model.  We find that SPT is negative and highly statistically significant 
for all three bandwidths. For example, using the 300 bandwidth, the coefficient on SPT is -3.223 
with t-stat of -2.35.  When institutional ownership is at its mean (0), managers issue less precise 
forecasts when speculation is greater.  We also find that SPT×INST is positive and significant for 
each bandwidth.  As short sales become more binding (i.e., when institutional ownership 
decreases), managers issue even less precise forecasts in response to greater speculative trading.  
Unfortunately, this analysis cannot reveal the precise economic significance of the results because 
the distribution of Precision cannot be modeled accurately.  Our results are similar in Panel B of 
Table 5 where we estimate the model using ordinal logit model.22 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
C. Equity incentives 
In this section, we consider the role of management equity incentives for the relationship 
between speculation and management forecast activity.  Because we study speculative trading and 
management forecasts over a relatively short horizon of two months (i.e., September and October), 
we analyze management’s ability to benefit from the stock price during that short window.  In the 
short-run, managers can benefit from overvaluation by selling shares or exercising vested in-the-
money stock options.  Based on this intuition we define STComp (i.e., short-term compensation) 
as the intrinsic value of in-the-money vested options plus the value of shares held by all executives 
as listed on Execucomp for the latest fiscal year, divided by the market value of the stock and 
 
22 In each second-stage regression, we test H0:Residual_SPT= Residual_INST = Residual_SPT*INST=0. The results 
show that the residuals from first stage are significantly different from 0 in second stage models. Hence, the inclusion 
of the residuals may control for the endogeneity in the original equation. 
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options portfolio held by the executives.23  Managers with higher STComp should have a stronger 
incentive to prolong the speculation so that they can personally benefit from the higher stock price. 
To identify this effect, we add STComp, SPT× STComp, INST× STComp, and STComp× 
SPT ×INST to the regression model given by Eq. (10).  We predict that the negative marginal effect 
of speculation on the frequency of management forecast (FREQ), the likelihood of issuing a 
forecast (PROB), and the precision of management forecasts (Precision) should be stronger when 
the value of managers’ unexercised exercisable options is higher.  The results are reported in Table 
6.  Consistent with our prediction, the coefficients on the interaction terms STComp×SPT×INST 
are positive across all specifications.  The results are statistically significant for Precision (Panel 
C).  For FREQ (Panel A) and PROB (Panel B), the results are (marginally) significant for 
bandwidth 250 and bandwidth 300.  Overall, the results are consistent with Bolton et al. (2006) 
who argue that equity incentives play an important role in motivating managers to boost the current 
stock price. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The analysis above assumes that one reason for managers to alter their voluntary 
disclosures in response to speculation is to take advantage of the resulting speculative premium. 
In Table 7, we directly examine whether speculation influences managers’ trading of their firms’ 
shares. Managers can benefit from prolonging the speculative premium by selling their stocks for 
capital gains.  Hence, we predict that managers would be more likely to sell their shares in response 
to greater speculation, especially when short-sale constraints are more binding. We define 
 
23 Baker and Hall (2004) discuss how to determine the appropriate denominator when measuring executive 
incentives.  Our results are similar if we deflate our measure by market value of shareholder equity. 
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InsiderSell as one if the total value of stock sold exceeds the total value of stock bought by 
managers during the last quarter of the year (September, October, November, and December).24  
Our results confirm that executives benefit from speculative trading by selling their shares, 
especially when short-sale constraints are more binding.  For all three bandwidths, the coefficient 
on SPT is significantly positive (for e.g., coefficient of -3.886 with t-stat of 1.98 for bandwidth 
300).    When institutional ownership is at its mean (0), managers are more likely to sell their 
shares when speculation is greater. One standard deviation increase in SPT is associated with 
51.87% higher likelihood of insider selling.  The results are even stronger when short-sale 
constraints are more binding.  The coefficient on SPT×INST is significantly negative (e.g., 
coefficient of -1.081 with t-stat of -1.89 for bandwidth 300). For example, when institutional 
ownership is at the fifth percentile, one standard deviation increase in SPT is associated with 
60.97% higher likelihood of insider selling.  
These findings support our assumption that managers are aware of the effect of speculation 
on equity prices and trade accordingly. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
V. Additional Tests 
A. Management forecasts vs. consensus analyst forecasts 
One necessary condition for the existence of a speculative premium is the presence of 
investors who are optimistic about the stock price relative to other investors (e.g., Miller, 1977; 
Hong and Stein, 2003; Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2006).  When short sales constraints are 
 
24 We use a longer window to increase the number of insider transactions in the test.  Our results are similar if we 
only focus on September and October.  We consider the CEO, President, CFO, Chief Operating Officer and Chief 




binding, the price reflects the beliefs of the most optimistic investors.  Managers in turn have 
incentives to support or cater to these optimistic beliefs.25  Any contradictory news is likely to 
reduce the speculative premium.  As a result, if managers are to issue a forecast, they should be 
more likely to issue good news forecast when there is greater speculation. 
We focus on range and point earnings forecasts issued in September and October of each 
respective year. For range forecasts, Ciconte et al. (2013) find that managers’ earnings 
expectations are closer to the upper bound of the range rather than to the midpoint. Hence, for 
range forecasts, we use the upper bound to represent the expectation of managers. We use the 
consensus (median) analyst earnings forecast within 90 days before the corresponding guidance 
day to proxy for the market’s expectations prior to the issuance of management forecasts.  We 
infer that a management forecast is good news if it is greater than or equal to the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast.  In this case, GoodNews is set to one.  Otherwise, GoodNews is set to zero.  
          There is a potential for a self-selection bias because the sample contains only firms that 
provide range and point earnings forecasts. We use the Heckman (1979) self-selection model to 
mitigate this issue.  We estimate a standard Probit selection model including all exogenous 
variables from Eq. (10) as well as additional firm-specific characteristics that help explain the 
choice to issue a range or point forecast.26  The model is shown below: 
𝑝(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑋)𝑖.(𝑡,𝑡+1) =       
             𝜑(𝑎1 + 𝛾1𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝛾5𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +
              𝛾6𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝛾7𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛾8𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛾9𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛾10𝐿𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾11𝑅𝐷𝑡 +
              𝛾12𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾13𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡 + 𝛾14𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾15𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛾16𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾17𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡 +
 
25 The implication is similar to the catering theory of overinvestment (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). 
26 See Ajinkaya et al (2005); Feng et al (2009); Li and Zhang (2014). 
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              𝛾18𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾19𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑓𝑡 + 𝛾20𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾21𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾22𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 +
              𝛾23𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,5)                                                                            (11)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
       We add the inverse Mills ratio from Eq. (11) as an additional control variable in Eq. (10). 27 
The results are reported in Table 8.  For each bandwidth, the coefficient on SPT is significantly 
positive and the coefficient on SPT×INST is significantly negative.  For example, using the 300 
bandwidth, the coefficient on SPT is 4.923 with a t-stat of 2.15, while the coefficient on SPT×INST 
is -2.742 with a t-stat of -2.24.  In terms of average marginal effects, one standard deviation increase 
in SPT is associated with 37.13% increase in the likelihood of managers issuing good news forecasts 
when institutional ownership is at its mean 0.  When institutional ownership is at its fifth percentile, 
one standard deviation increase in SPT is associated with 49.32% increase in the likelihood of 
managers issuing good news on average.  This result shows that managers are more likely to support 
or cater to the beliefs of optimistic investors in response to speculation, especially when short-sale 
constraints are more binding.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
B. Excess returns around management forecast dates 
Our analysis of the likelihood, frequency, and precision of management forecasts assumes 
that management forecasts reduce the speculative premium.  In this section, we provide evidence 
on this assumption by examining the excess returns around management forecast dates.  We use 
the cumulative three-day excess return around the management forecast date as the dependent 
variable in Eq. (10).  Table 9 reports the results.  We find that on average SPT is not reliably 
associated with excess stock returns around management forecast dates.  However, as short-sale 
 





constraints become more binding, the negative association between excess returns and speculative 
trading becomes stronger (SPT×INST is positive and marginally significant for all three 
bandwidths).  These findings provide some support for our assumption that management forecasts 
reduce the speculative premium in our setting. These findings are also consistent with previous 
research showing that earning announcements and management forecasts reduce overvaluation 
(Berkman et al., 2009; Seybert and Yang, 2012).  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
C. Regulation SHO 
Although institutional ownership is a commonly used proxy for short-sale constraints, 
institutional ownership also proxies for external monitoring and investor sophistication. In this 
section, we analyze whether our results are robust to using an alternative proxy for short-sale 
constraints. We take advantage of Regulation SHO that relaxes short-sale constraints for randomly 
chosen Russell firms to re-examine the primary results.  
In July 2004, the SEC approved Rule 202T, which established a pilot program to study the 
effect of short-sale constraints on the price formation process.  The program selected a random 
sample for 968 Russell 3000 firms for which the short sale uptick rule was suspended from 2005 
to 2007.  Grullon et al. (2015) report that firms in the pilot program experienced in an increase in 
short selling.  We construct a dummy variable SHO that equals one if a firm in the Russell 3000 
sample belongs to the pilot program, and zero otherwise.  For this test, our analysis is restricted to 
the period from 2004 to 2006. We then estimate Eq. (12) for each dependent variable using SHO 
instead of INST as a proxy for short-sale constraints.  
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏 + 𝜃0𝑆𝐻𝑂 + 𝜃1𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝐻𝑂 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
                              𝜃5𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃6𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +   𝜃7𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃8𝜖1̂,𝑖 + 𝜃9𝜖2̂,𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡           (12)                                                                          
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The results are reported in Table 10.  Consistent with our prior findings, we find that the 
coefficients on SPT are negative and coefficients on SPT*SHO are positive across all 
specifications.  The coefficients on SPT*SHO are statistically significant at conventional level 
except for Precision using the 200 and 250 bandwidth.  The lower statistical significance might 
reflect the smaller sample size (i.e., we have only three years of data). Despite this limitation, the 
results using Regulation SHO are consistent with our main results. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
D. Contemporaneous analyst coverage 
This section explores the possibility that the relationship between speculation and the 
characteristics of management forecast is confounded by the effect of contemporaneous analyst 
coverage. Lee and So (2017) show that analysts are more likely to cover underpriced firms because 
these firms are more likely to generate higher returns for their clients.  Hence, it is possible that 
some analysts choose not to cover a firm when its speculative premium is greater. In turn, managers 
may alter their disclosures in response to analyst coverage (e.g., Anantharaman and Zhang, 2011). 
To alleviate this concern, we control for contemporaneous analyst coverage in Eq. (10) 
instrumented using expected coverage based on broker size (see Yu (2008)).  The results are 
reported in Table 11.  We find that controlling for analyst coverage does not affect our results. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
E. Alternative Russell ranks 
In this section, we follow the identification strategy of Crane et al. (2015) to construct the 
bandwidths around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and test our hypotheses. We rank all Russell 
3000 firms based on market capitalization at the end of May rather than based on index weights, 
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and control for the distance to the threshold (Rank-1000) and the interaction R2000*(Rank-1000). 
The model is specified as follows and is estimated by OLS: 
𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝛽1𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) + 𝛽3𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) +
                𝛽4𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖,1                         (13)                                                              
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎2 + 𝜑1𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜑2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) + 𝜑3𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) +
                  𝜑4𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖,2                       (14)                                                                          
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 × 𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎3 + 𝛿1𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) + 𝛿3𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 ×
                  (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) + 𝛿4𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖,3                                                       (15)                                                                                                             
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑎4 + 𝜓1𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓4(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) +
                  𝜓5𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 1000) +  𝜓6𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓7𝜖1,?̂? + 𝜓8𝜖2,?̂? + 𝜓9𝜖3,?̂? +
                  ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖                                                                                                                 (16) 
        Table 12 reports the two-stage results using three bandwidths.  Consistent with our prior 
results, the coefficients on SPT are all negative and statistically significant and the coefficients on 
INST*SPT are all positive and are significant in seven out of nine specifications.  Overall, the 
results show that our prior findings are not driven by the choice of how we compute Russell ranks. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between speculation and management forecast 
activity. We use the three-pass regression filter of Kelly and Pruitt (2015) to construct a proxy for 
speculation. We then use the yearly Russell 1000/2000 reconstitution to establish a causal 
relationship between speculation and management forecast activity. We find that speculation 
reduces the frequency, likelihood, and the precision of management forecasts.  Consistent with 
theory, the results are stronger when short-sale constraints are more binding.  We link the findings 
to management’s equity incentives by showing that our results are stronger when managers stand 
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to gain more from overvalued equity. We also find that managers are more likely to sell shares and 
issue good news forecasts when speculative trading is greater and short-sale constraints are more 
binding.    
Overall, our evidence suggests that managers are not passive bystanders when investors 
speculate in the company’s shares.  Instead, managers act opportunistically to prolong the 
speculative trading, especially when short-sale constraints are more binding.  They keep silent 
when possible, or issue fewer and more ambiguous forecasts.  This may explain why the 
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Appendix A：Definition of Variables 
Dependent variables 
CAR(-1,1) The cumulative three-day excess return around management forecast dates. Daily excess return is 
calculated relative to the CRSP value-weighted index return (CRSP). 
FREQ The number of management forecasts (number of earnings forecasts plus number of sales forecasts) 
during September and October of each respective year (IBES) 
PROB 1 if a firm issues at least one management forecast during September and October, and 0 otherwise 
(IBES). 
Precision 3 for a point forecast during September and October, 2 for an interval forecast, 1 for an open-ended 
forecast, 0 for a qualitative forecast, and -1 for no forecast. (IBES) 
GoodNews 1 if a manager issues an EPS forecast during September and October greater than or equal to the median 
analyst EPS forecast, 0 otherwise (IBES). 
InsidersSell 1 if the total value of stock sold by managers exceeds that of stock bought by managers during the four-
month window (September, October, November and December) of each respective year, and 0 otherwise 
(Thomson Reuters). 
Coverage The number of analysts covering a firm during September and October of each respective year (IBES). 
Main independent variables 
SPT Turnover due to belief heterogeneity, constructed using the three pass regression filter method. 
R2000 1 if a firm is assigned to Russell 2000 index, and 0 if a firm is assigned to Russell 1000 index. The 
Russell membership list is provided by FTSE Russell. 
INST The percentage of shares held by institutional investors in September of each respective year (Thomson 
13F). 
IVInstt-5 The average institutional ownership of other firms across different periods. We first calculate the five-
quarter lagged institutional ownership for each firm in each year and then pool these lagged institutional 
ownership levels to construct a new sample. For each firm around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, we 
bootstrap N observations (i.e., we use N=500) from this sample with replacement but exclude the values 
of the firm itself. The mean of these N observations is the instrument for institutional ownership.  
STCOMP Intrinsic value of in-the-money vested options plus the value of shares held by the top 5 executives for 
the latest fiscal year (Execucomp), divided by the sum of market value of the stock and options portfolio 
held by these executives. Data on market value of executives’ stock and option portfolio is provided by 
Lalitha Naveen at https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/; see Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)). 
SHO 1 if a firm is chosen to participate in the SEC SHO pilot program, and 0 otherwise.   
Other control variables 
Rank Rank order of Russell firms based on index weights. 
Float The difference between the rank based on market values at the end of May and the rank based on index 
weights (Crane et al., 2015). 
Ret Average daily stock return for September of each respective year (CRSP). 
Lnmv The logarithm of a firm's market capitalization at the end of May of each respective year (CRSP). 
Residual_SPT The residual from the following equation, which captures the endogenous component of SPT, 
SPTi,t = a1 + α2R2000i,t + α3Ranki,t + α4MVi,t + α5Floati,t + α6Reti,t + ∑ year + ϵi,1   
Residual_INST The residual from the following equation, which captures the endogenous component of INST, 
INSTi,t = β1 + β2IVinsti + β3Ranki,t + β4MVi,t + β5Floati,t + β6Reti,t + ∑ year + ϵi,2. 
Residual_SPT×INST The residual from the following equation, which possibly captures the endogenous component of 
interaction term SPT*INST, 
SPT× INSTi,t=γ1+γ2R2000i,t×IVinsti + γ3Ranki,t + γ4MVi,t + γ5Floati,t + γ6Reti,t+ ∑ year  + ϵi,3  
M/B Market-to-book ratio. We use market capitalization as of September and latest available book value of 
equity prior to September (Compustat). 
Loss 1 if the latest available quarterly net income at September or August is negative, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
UC Proxy for uncertainty, defined as return volatility no driven by speculative trading. It is calculated as the 
residual from a cross-sectional regression of volatility of excess returns (VOL) on SPT in August of each 
respective year. 
Liquidity Proxy for liquidity using data for August. See Amihud (2002). 















Research and development expenditures divided by total assets for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or 
prior to September; set to 0 if it is missing (Compustat). 
Lev Total debt scaled by total asset for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or prior to September (Compustat). 
PIN Probability of informed trading for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or prior to September. See Easley 
et al. (1996). Data are provided by Stephen Brown at http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data. 
Litigation 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry (SIC codes 2833-2836; 3570-3577; 3600-3674; 5200-
2961; and 7370-7374), and 0 otherwise (Compustat). 
Lnasset Logarithm of total asset for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or prior to September (Compustat). 
ROA Net income scaled by total asset for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or prior to September (Compustat). 
Divdend Dividend per share for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or prior to September (Compustat). 
Growth (Revenue for the latest fiscal quarter ending in or prior to September / Revenue for the previous fiscal 
quarter) – 1 (Compustat). 
Stdocf The standard deviation of operating cash flow scaled by total asset over the past six quarters. 
(Compustat). 
BIG4 Indicator variable taking 1 if the firm has a BIG 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 







 Expected coverage of a firm in September and October of each respective year: 
 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛





Brokersizejt is the total number of analysts employed by broker j in September and October; 
Brokersizejt-1 is the total number of analysts employed by broker j in June, July and August. 
Coverageijt is the total number of analysts to firm i by brokerage firm j in June, July and August. See 
Yu (2008). 
         InverseMills Inverse Mills ratio from the following Probit model:  
𝑝(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑋)𝑖.(𝑡,𝑡+1) = 𝜑(𝑎1 + 𝛾1𝑅2000𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 +
 𝛾5𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝛾7𝐿𝑛𝑚𝑣 + 𝛾8𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 +  𝛾9𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛾10𝐿𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾11𝑅𝐷𝑡 +
𝛾12𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾13𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡 + 𝛾14𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾15𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛾16𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾17𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾18𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +
𝛾19𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑓𝑡 + 𝛾20𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾21𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾22𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾23𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,5)  
Proxies for heterogeneous beliefs 








VOL Volatility of daily excess returns (e.g., Garfinkel, 2009; Berkman et al., 2009). We calculate variance 
of daily excess return (relative to the return on the value-weighted CRSP index) using all available 




∑(𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
2 
Spread Bid-ask spread (Garfinkel, 2009). We calculate the mean of the daily bid-ask spread for each month. At 







AUV Unexpected daily trading volume scaled by the standard deviation of residuals from the following 
regression: 
𝐴𝑈𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑈𝑉𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜎𝑖,𝑡





We first regress daily volume on two variables derived from daily stock return for each Russell 3000 
firm with a sample from 1996 to 2006. |𝑅𝑖,𝑡|
+
 equals the return’s value if the return is positive, and 0 if 
the return is negative or missing. |𝑅𝑖,𝑡|
−
equals the return’s absolute value if the return is negative, and 
0 if the return is positive or missing. Then we calculate the average unexpected volume for each month 
and the standard deviation of the residuals over the whole estimation period (Garfinkel and Sokobin, 
2006; Garfinkel, 2009). The estimation is performed using the local linear regression method. 
ADISP Dispersion of analyst forecasts. We calculate the standard deviation of analysts’ EPS forecast during 
each month (e.g., Deither et al., 2002; Garfinkel, 2009). Disp1 is standard deviation scaled by the 
average forecast; Disp2 is standard deviation scaled by the average stock price in the corresponding 









∑(𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2
|𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|
, where N > 2 
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ODISP1 Volume-weighted option strike dispersion. We aggregate daily trading volume of options (Vj) for each 
strike price to obtain monthly trading volume and then calculate the proportion of trading volume 















𝑎𝑛𝑑 K is the number of strike price. 
We only consider call and put options satisfying the following two properties: non-ATM options 
(moneyness between 0.975 and 1.025); and maturities between 7 and 90 days. Additionally, we keep 
the days in which there are more than four contracts to avoid the effect of thinly-traded options.  See 
Zhu (2015) and Andreou et al. (2018). 
ODISP2 Open-interest-weighted option strike dispersions. Given a stock in a certain month, we select the open 
interest (OIj) of last trading day of this month for each strike price to obtain monthly and then calculate 
the proportion of open interest attached to each strike price. See Zhu (2015). 
𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝2 =













𝑎𝑛𝑑 K is the number of strike prices. 
OI Open interest. The average of daily open interest (the sum of call open interest and put open interest) in 




∑ (Call OIj + Put OIj)
N
j=1 , where N is number of trading days. 





j=1 , where OVj is the daily option trading volume for day j and N 






Appendix B: Instrument for institutional ownership 
       This section discusses how we construct the instrument for institutional ownership. We first 
calculate the five-quarter lagged institutional ownership for each firm in each year and then pool 
these lagged institutional ownership data to construct a new sample.28  For each firm around the 
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, we bootstrap N observations (i.e., we use N=500) from this new 
sample with replacement but exclude the values of the firm itself. The mean of these N 
observations is the instrument for institutional ownership.  
          The exclusion restriction is that the unobservable characteristics of any firm i at time t are 
uncorrelated with the average institutional ownership of the other N firms across different periods: 





→ 0                          
(B1) 
 where −𝑖𝑘 indicates firm other than i and −𝑡𝑘 indicates a time period other than t. It is possible 
that the unobservable characteristics of firm i at time t are correlated with the institutional 
ownerships of some other firms. However, as long as the sum of the terms in the numerator of Eq. 
(B1) is small enough compared to N, the exclusion restriction still holds.  
The relevance assumption is that the institutional ownership of any firm i at time t is 
correlated with the average institutional ownership of the other N firms across different periods: 





                
(B2) 
 
28 We use a five-quarter lag to ensure that institutional ownership is not related to the current Russell index assignment. 
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As we prove below, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡−𝑖,−𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) is non-zero when quarterly institutional ownership of 
a firm is auto-correlated and different firms are simultaneously affected by the reconstitution of 
Russell indices. 
Proof: 
     For a firm i or j around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, we assume that institutional ownership 
follows AR (1) process:  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                               (B3) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛿 + 𝜆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡                                                               (B4) 
where t is the quarter following reconstitution, t-1 is the previous quarter, and ϵt is a random shock 
(i.e., the reconstitution of Russell indices).29  We also assume that (𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑗,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑗,𝑡, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0, and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡 are stationary (i.e., |γ| <
1𝑎𝑛𝑑 |λ| < 1).30  Then we have: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛾𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑗,𝑡, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)                                 (B5) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑗,𝑡,𝜖𝑖,𝑡)
1−𝛾𝜆
                                             (B6) 
     As firm i and j are both subject to the reconstitution of the Russell indices,  Cov(ϵ𝑗,𝑡, ϵ𝑖,𝑡) is 
non-zero and thereby Cov(Inst𝑗,𝑡, Inst𝑖,𝑡) is non-zero. 








                                                        (B8) 
 
29 We find that the average quarterly institutional ownership of Russell 3000 firms follows AR (1) process during 
our sample periods. 
 
30 We make these assumptions for simplicity.  Eq. (B2) is likely to hold even if we relax these assumptions.  
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𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−𝜏) and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡−𝜏, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) are non-zero unless τ goes to infinity. 
Therefore, the institutional ownership of firm i at t can be correlated with the institutional 
ownership of firm j at other times. As a result, some of terms in the numerator of Eq. (B2) are non-
zero. 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡−𝑖,−𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) in Eq. (B2) should also be non-zero as long as these non-zero terms 






Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the proxies for heterogeneous beliefs 
Variable Mean Median Std dev Skew Kurt Max Min 
TURN 0.007 0.005 0.006 1.416 1.174 0.024 0.0004 
VOL 0.027 0.022 0.016 1.256 1.012 0.074 0.008 
SPREAD 0.011 0.007 0.011 1.476 1.706 0.048 0.0007 
ASUV -0.011 -0.109 0.472 0.772 -0.199 1.078 -0.637 
ADISP1 0.091 0.034 0.141 2.565 6.011 0.609 0.006 
ADISP2 0.004 0.002 0.006 2.496 5.859 0.029 0.0003 
ODISP1 0.092 0.083 0.047 0.782 0.064 0.206 0.022 
ODISP2 0.101 0.089 0.068 0.757 -0.034 0.262 0.002 
OI 70,562 6,402 146,661 2.502 5.096 559,366 43 
OV 6,131.7 906 11,864 2.433 4.815 45,307 15 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the pre-standardized proxies for heterogeneous beliefs. The 
sample contains Russell 3000 firms, beginning from June 1995 to June 2007. All variables are 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
Panel A. Russell 1000 
 Mean Median Stdev Skew Max Min 
SPT 0.35 0.29 0.60 0.14 3.00 -5.73 
INST 0.64 0.67 0.20 -0.55 0.99 0.005 
FREQ 0.51 0.00 1.01 2.78 14 0.00 
PROB 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.74 1.00 0.00 
Precision 1.94 2.00 0.79 -0.99 3.00 0.00 
Goodnews 0.19 0.00 0.39 1.57 1.00 0.00 
STDCOMP 0.66 0.69 0.25 -0.31 1.26 0.07 
Insidersell 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.29 1.00 0.00 
Lnmv 22.3 22.0 1.10 0.99 16.9 17.6 
Ret -0.007 0.003 0.13 -0.48 0.41 -0.45 
 
Panel B. Russell 2000 
 Mean Median Std de Skew Max Min 
SPT 0.28 0.24 0.73 0.10 4.30 -4.15 
INST 0.53 0.53 0.26 -0.01 0.99 0.005 
FREQ 0.24 0.00 0.67 3.52 7.00 0.00 
PROB 0.15 0.00 0.36 1.95 1.00 0.00 
Precision 1.94 2.00 0.69 -1.04 3.00 0.00 
Goodnews 0.10 0.00 0.31 2.58 1.00 0.00 
Insidersell 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.71 1.00    0.00  
STDCOMP 0.66 0.70 0.28 -0.34 1.27    0.07  
Lnmv 19.9 19.9 0.64 0.09 16.7 22.3 
Ret -0.004 0.00 0.16 -0.18 0.41 -0.45 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for firms in Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices. 





















Table 3: The result of the first stage regression 
Panel A. Speculation (SPT) 




































Adj R2 0.034 0.033 0.035 
F-statistic 10.05*** 12.24*** 15.87*** 
Observations 3,092 3,862 4,617 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
 
Panel B. Institutional ownership (INST) 




































Adj R2 0.227 0.216 0.207 
F-statistic 51.47*** 58.62*** 69.78*** 
Observations 4,337 5,385 6,461 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
Panel A presents the coefficient estimates from Eq. (6) that examines the effect of index assignment (R2000) 
on speculation (SPT). The estimates are calculated over ±200, ±250 and ±300 ranks from the threshold. Panel 
B presents the coefficient estimates from Eq. (7) that examines the effect of the average institutional ownership 
of other firms (IVinst) on standardized institutional ownership (INST). The models are estimated over the 1996–
2006 period using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 300 around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. Coefficients on 
R2000 and IVinst are reported with the t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to 
calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 










Table 4: The joint effect of speculation and short-sale constraints on 
frequency of management forecasts 
 
Panel A: Frequency of Management Forecasts 





























































Observation 2,693 3,376 4,052 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
Panel B: Probability of issuing a management Forecast 





























































Observation 2,693 3,376 4,052 




Panel A presents the estimates of the effect of speculation (SPT) on the frequency of management forecasts (FREQ). 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the estimates of the effect of speculation (SPT) on the probability of issuing a management 
forecast (PROB). The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 300 firms 
around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
























Table 5: The joint effect of speculation and short-sale constraints on 
precision of earnings forecasts 
 
Panel A: Linear model 





























































Observation 2,890 3,618 4,328 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
Panel B: Ordinal logit model 





























































Observation 2,890 3,618 4,328 




This table presents the estimates of the effect of speculation (SPT) on the specificity of earnings forecasts 
(Precision). Panel A shows the results of the linear model. Panel B shows the results of the ordinal logit 
model. The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 300 firms 
around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold.  We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate 































Table 6: The effect of equity incentives on the relationship between speculation and management forecasts 
Bandwidth: 200 Bandwidth: 250 Bandwidth: 300 
Panel A: Frequency of management forecasts 
 Estimator Estimator Estimator  






























Observation 1,642 2,078 2,531 
Panel B: Probability of issuing a management forecast 































Observation 1,642 1,987 2,531 
Panel C: Precision of earnings forecasts 
 Estimator  Estimator Estimator 






























Observation 1,859 2,345 2,839 
 
This table presents the estimates of the effect of equity incentives on the relationship between disagreement-
based speculation (SPT) and FREQ, PROB and Precision. We include STComp, SPT* STComp, INST* 
STComp, and SPT* STComp*INST in the Eq. (10). The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period 
using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 300 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We only report the 
variables of interest for brevity. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate 




Table 7: The joint effect of speculation and short-sale constraints on insider trading 





























































Observation 2,693 3,376 4,052 
 Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
This table presents the estimates of the effect of speculation (SPT) on the probability of selling shares by 
managers (Insidersell). The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 
300 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and 


















Table 8: The joint effect of speculation and short-sale constraints on 
optimism of earnings forecasts 
 



































































Observation 2,738 3,439 4,015 
 Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
This table presents the estimates of the effect of speculation (SPT) on the probability of issuing good news 
(Goodnews). The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 300 
firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and 













Table 9: The joint effect of speculation and short-sale constraints on  
cumulative excess returns around forecast dates 
 
































































Observation 1,305 1,892 1,939 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year 
 
This table presents estimates of the effects of speculation (SPT) on three-day cumulative excess returns 
around management forecast dates (CAR). We select management forecasts issued in September and 
October of each respective year. The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using bandwidths 
of 200, 250 and 300 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics 
in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in 








Table 10: Robustness test using regulation SHO  
 Bandwidth: 200 Bandwidth: 250 Bandwidth: 300 





















































































































































































Observation 876 876 926 1,111 1,111 1,185 1,340 1,340 1,423 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
 
This  table presents estimates of the effects of speculation (SPT) on FREQ, PROB and Precision using an alternative measure of short-sale constraints. In 
July 2004, the SEC approved Rule 202T, which established a pilot program to study the effect of short-sale constraints on the price formation process. The 
program selects a random sample for 968 Russell 3000 firms for which the short sale uptick rule is suspended from 2005 to 2007. We set SHO to 1 for 
these firms and 0 for the remaining firms. The model is estimated over the 2004–2006 period using the bandwidth of 300 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 
threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in 




Table 11: The joint effect of speculation and short-sale constraints on management forecasts 
after controlling for analyst coverage 
 
Bandwidth: 200  Bandwidth: 250  Bandwidth: 300  
































     Observation 2,458 3, 086 3,690 
Panel B. Probability of issuing a management forecast 




























      Observation 2,458 3,086 3,693 
Panel C. Precision of earnings forecasts 




























      Observation 2,672 3,339 3,986 
 
This table presents the estimates of the effect of speculation (SPT) on FREQ, PROB and Precision after 
we control for contemporaneous analyst coverage (Coverage). We only report the variables of interest for 
brevity. The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using bandwidths of 200, 250 and 300 firms 
around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate 






Table 12: Alternative model specification 
 Bandwidth: 200 Bandwidth: 250 Bandwidth: 300 



































































































































































Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations 2,735 2,735 2,957 3,428 3,428 3,721 4,123 4,123 4,429 
 
This table presents the results of two-stage estimation based on Eq. (13), (14), (15) and (16). We follow Crane et al. (2015) and use ranks based on the firm’s 
market capitalization at the end of May rather than index weights. The models are estimated over the 1996–2006 period using the bandwidth of 300 firms 
around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. We report estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to calculate t statistics. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
